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In post socialist countries that now form the eastern member states of the European 
Union there was a general vision of the society from the early nineties to catch up 
to the developed West. The dream of reaching the level of western European eco-
nomic development and living standards was the main driver for economic transi-
tion and EU integration. In spite of modest convergence, however, the difference 
between the West and the East has remained dominant until today, ten years after 
the EU accession, while the core–periphery duality is also an important economic-
geographic dimension in the European single market. The changing relative posi-
tion of these regions in economic terms and the interrelation between the East and 
West of the EU is in the focus of this paper. It addresses some specifi cs of regional 
economic development of this area and particularly of Hungary at both macro-
regional and regional levels paying attention to the economic crisis which started 
in 2007. In most of the eastern bloc, economic transition and EU integration were 
associated with several challenges and followed by imbalanced regional develop-
ment as a result of the dominant role of the foreign direct investments in regional 
development, which led to the territorial concentration and increase of regional 
inequalities among regions within these countries.
Keywords: European Union, economic development, regional development, East-
ern Central Europe, Hungary, transition, economic geography
Introduction
Around 1990, the countries of Eastern Central Europe, including Hungary, chose 
market economy instead of the centrally planned one, shifted their political ori-
entation to the capitalist Western Europe instead of Moscow, and started inte-
grating to Western Europe, instead of the Council for Mutual Economic Assist-
ance (CMEA), the economic organizing scheme of the eastern bloc. There are no 
doubts that these political and economic reorientations had very strong support 
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from the vast majority of societies that time due to numerous reasons. One key 
reason was probably of the highest importance, that is, the assumed promise of 
the economically more successful capitalist world through which these societies 
might gain better quality of life, reach the welfare level of the western European 
countries. The dream of catching up to the West became the key motivation for 
introducing several economic reforms and a sort of fuel to attain the support of 
the society to accept and sometimes even welcome measures, such as privatiza-
tion, market liberalization or giving up centrally-secured full employment, which 
in Hungary, for example, culminated in the loss of 1.5 million jobs in the early 
nineties. The dream of catching up became a common framework of understand-
ing that induced these countries to follow the patterns of western economies and 
to quickly internalize the guidelines coming from the institutionalized European 
Union. 
More than a decade has passed since most of the current post socialist member 
states – Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Slovenia, 
Lithuania – joined the European Union, followed some years later by Roma-
nia, Bulgaria, and recently Croatia. By today, these countries have a wide range 
of experiences and it is clearly observable that they have had to face several 
challenges during the transition and their development track is by far not the 
same  as the western economies had experienced earlier. Attaining the level of 
the Western welfare does not seem evident now, in addition, there are also some 
other consequential effects of market liberalization and accession to the European 
integration from the point of regional development. The economic performance 
and the position in a single market economic space differ strongly among regions 
within the eastern block and even the regional differences within these countries 
have increased, sometimes to a radical extent during the last two decades. After 
twenty years of evolution of these regions, the economic crisis which started in 
2008 has generated a new and much quicker dynamics with regionally selective 
impacts, infl uencing the position of the whole post-socialist eastern zone and also 
its regions. It seems that the economic crisis contributed to the rearrangement 
of the macro-geography of the economic development of the European Union, 
and infl uenced the regional inequalities within the countries, too. Nowadays it 
is important to pay attention to the current impacts, and even more, to the pos-
sible further consequences of recent geopolitical events, particularly the confl icts 
around the Islamic State in the Middle East and North Africa that are bringing 
about increasing waves of migration. In this rearrangement, the position of the 
post socialist eastern bloc, including that of Hungary, is also changing.
By addressing these issues, this paper aims to contribute to a better understand-
ing of the changing position of the regions of this eastern EU bloc and particu-
larly of Hungary in the territory of the European single market. It pays particular 
attention to the core–periphery geography of the EU and the regional concentra-
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tion within the member states of that zone focusing on Hungary. The analysis is 
based on the databases of Eurostat and the Hungarian Central Statistical Offi ce 
(KSH), and uses secondary sources, particularly the latest cohesion report of the 
European Commission (2014), analyses of ESPON program (2005 and 2010) and 
the Central Bank of Hungary (2014).
The Changing Position of the Eastern Part of the EU
The EU produces 21–23 per cent of the world gross domestic product, similarly 
to the United States’ performance, though its population of half a billion is 60 per 
cent more than that of the USA. The contribution of the post-socialist member 
states to the total EU performance is 7.8 percent, a defi nite increase compared to 
5.5 per cent at the accession year of 2004. However, it is still a limited progress 
compared to the 20 per cent share of these countries within the population of the 
EU. Hungary’s contribution to the GDP of the European Union is 0.74 per cent 
with stagnation or a little fall as a result of negative demographic trends (See 
Table 1).
Table 1. The share of Hungary and the post socialist EU member states 
in GDP and population of the European Union (%) (Data source: Eurostat)
2004 (%) 2014 (%)
Share of Hungary in the total population of the EU28 2.05 1.95
Share of Hungary in the total GDP (at market price) of the EU28 0.75 0.74
Share of Hungary in the total GDP (PPS**) of the EU28 1.27 1.31
Share of the post socialist member states* in the total population 
of the EU28 21.62 20.44
Share of the post socialist member states* in the total GDP (at 
market price) of the EU28 5.46 7.89
Share of the post socialist member states* in the total GDP 
(PPS**) of the EU28 10.88 13.41
 *Poland, Hungary, Czech Rep., Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, Bul-
garia, Croatia
** PPS: purchasing power parity 
It is a fact that there are signifi cant growth potentials in the less developed 
eastern zone of the European Union due to its emerging markets where demand 
is growing, the cost of labor force is low, and the population has an increasing 
mobility. This zone, which is in a gateway location towards the rapidly growing 
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Asian markets has in the long term higher growth rates, and increasing innovation 
possibilities in production. The recognition of the good business opportunities this 
region offers for the Western European economies from the early nineties was a 
key motivation of the eastward extension of the European integration. In the last 
two decades the eastern bloc has been in a slow but obvious catching-up process 
in a number of areas such as transport accessibility, GDP growth, received foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and expansion of trade in goods and services within the 
group of new member states, the so-called EU-13 (joined in 2004 or later) and 
between EU-13 and EU-15, the group of older member states (See Figure 1). The 
process of catching-up, on the other hand, has recently been slowing down. 
Figure 1. Evolution of GDP per capita in PPS of the Visegrád four countries in relation to the 
average of the 28 current EU member states (EU28 = 100%) (Data source: Eurostat)
Now we must see that the economic disparities between the East and the West 
still represent the most obvious regional dimension in the European Union. If we 
consider quality of life, we can still discover an even wider gap between the West 
and the East than what the GDP (measured by purchasing power parity method) 
shows. As we can see in fi gures, for instance in the 6th cohesion report (European 
Commission, 2014: 93), life expectancy – which is a key indicator of health – is 
extremely different westward of the former iron curtain than eastward. The Eastern 
Central European countries made good progress in setting up the system of market 
economy, but the east-west dichotomy of the European Union remained, although 
with changing meaning since the post socialist economies are in a weak and some-
times dependent position. The integration to the single market created still-existing 
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diffi culties. The post socialist countries had carried their negative heritage, such as 
lack of suffi cient capital, the weaknesses of domestic companies to compete in the 
single market, the rapid loss of their domestic market, and the dependence on for-
eign capital, and multinational companies. Most of these countries are highly open 
economies – e.g. Hungary’s export is almost the same as its total GDP – with high 
exposure to global changes and a risk of vulnerability. In such dual organizational 
structure of the economy, most of the domestic small and medium enterprises taking 
part in the export oriented production are dependent on the large foreign companies 
as suppliers. However, not only companies, but also cities, regions, even states de-
pend sometimes extremely on only one or a handful of companies. Such cases are 
in Hungary the dominant role in the local economies of IBM in Székesfehérvár, 
of NOKIA in Komárom, of Audi in Győr, of Mercedes production in Kecskemét. 
These multinational companies can quickly bring a sort of prosperity, but their relo-
cation could fi nish in crisis as we saw it in some cases, e.g. Székesfehérvár. These 
regions are attractive more for economic activities with lower added value; while 
knowledge intensive industries are much less frequent there with the exception 
of some capital regions. Nowadays the competition among regions is more about 
the ability to link to and also to anchor higher levels of the so called value chains 
of economic activities, where the higher value added activities are concentrated, 
such as innovation or design. Those regions which are attractive locations only for 
manufacturing – which is a low level in the value chain – could never approach the 
development level of the core areas of global economy, like some of the western 
European regions. 
Most of the rural regions of the post socialist bloc face severe diffi culties in 
fi nding their function in the highly integrated EU arena. These regions are typi-
cally not able to compete in the highly competitive export markets, while as a 
consequence of market liberalization and globalization the domestic and local 
markets have shrunk due to the increased import. This is important because the 
eastern bloc is less urbanized. In 2014 only 62 per cent of the population of the 
eight Eastern-Central European member states were living in cities, while this 
fi gure is 79 per cent in the EU-15. (United Nations, 2014: 199)
The Impact of the Economic Crisis
The global fi nancial crisis that started in 2007 and spread in 2008 strongly af-
fected the EU by changing its development path, just like for most of the devel-
oped world (see Figure 2). As current analyses of The Central Bank of Hungary 
revealed, the latest crisis is unlike any previous crises in the world since the 
Second World War. Although the imbalance in the generation and utilization of 
income and in the global distribution of savings and investment opportunities 
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preceding the current crisis were similar to the imbalances prevailing in the past 
– as was ultimately refl ected in the widening of current account positions – the 
emergence of protracted current account imbalances of unprecedented magnitude 
was a novelty, which affected several economic agents and regions simultane-
ously. (Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 2014: 10) The account imbalances are in strong 
connection with the debts of countries. The greatest external debt of the global 
regions was accumulated in the EU. It is alarming that even in 2014 the govern-
ment debts to GDP ratio increased in the total European Union (EU-28) from 85.5 
per cent to 86.8 per cent, although the government defi cit could already decrease. 
The increase of governmental debt has also set serious limits to local and regional 
authorities, themselves often also indebted. 
Figure 2. EU28, euro area and United States GDP growth rates (% change over the previous 
quarter) (Source: Eurostat, 2015: 1) 
Therefore, the current situation in the European Union is dramatically differ-
ent from what it was at the start of the previous fi nancial period in 2007. As the 
sixth cohesion report pointed out (European Commission, 2014: XV–XVII), that 
time the EU was still enjoying a sustained period of economic growth. Income 
levels were rising as were employment rates and public investment; poverty 
and social exclusion were diminishing and regional disparities were generally 
shrinking (at least at the level of countries). The advent of the crisis changed all 
this. Since 2008, public debt has increased dramatically, income has declined for 
many people across the EU, employment rates have fallen in most countries and 
unemployment is higher than for over 20 years while poverty and social exclu-
sion have become more widespread. The shock of the economic depression was 
territorially very selective. Not only countries, but even regions, different types 
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of cities and also main macro regions of the EU showed sensitivity or resistance 
to very different extents. The onset of the crisis led to major reductions in the EU 
in trade and foreign direct investment that are important sources of growth for the 
less developed member states. Exports of the EU-13 to other EU countries, how-
ever, have shown signifi cant recovery and now account for a larger share of their 
GDP than before the crisis, while FDI has also picked up. In most parts of the 
EU, metropolitan regions have been shown to be more prone to booms and busts, 
while overall rural regions have proved more resilient. In the EU-15, second-tier 
metropolitan regions performed near the average, while in the EU-13, they out-
performed other regions. Rural regions in the EU-15 had a smaller contraction 
of GDP than the other regions between 2008 and 2011 due to higher productivity 
growth. Also, in the EU-13, higher productivity growth meant that they closed 
the growth gap with the other regions. In transition and less developed regions, 
increases in unemployment have been larger, averaging 5 percentage points be-
tween 2008 and 2013 as against 3 percentage points in more developed regions. 
(European Commission, 2014: XXX)
Austerity policies, less public funding are infl uencing the possibilities of re-
gional and urban development as well, and push local actors to do more to re-
generate from crisis and foster economic growth at local level. This is why in the 
EU member states and also at the level of European Union policies focused on 
growth gained very high importance and other policies have necessarily lost their 
positions. The experience of the economic crisis and the still existing obvious 
challenges strongly infl uence regional, spatial and urban planning policies.
Recent Development of Regions in Eastern Central Europe
Between 2000 and 2011, all the regions in the central and eastern member states 
recorded an increase in GDP per head (in PPS) relative to the EU average. The 
biggest increases were typically in the capital city regions. Indeed, in these re-
gions in Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria, GDP per head in PPS terms increased 
markedly (to 186 per cent of the EU average in the fi rst, 122 per cent in the sec-
ond and 78 per cent in the third), in the fi rst two countries by more than double 
the national average increase. In the less developed regions in Greece, Italy and 
Portugal (except the Azores), however, there was no increase in GDP per head 
relative to the EU average, in Greece due to the severe effect of the crisis, but in 
the other two, partly to their growth rates being relatively low before the crisis. 
(European Commission, 2014: 1)
The sixth cohesion report stated that the GDP per head grew faster in real terms 
in the less developed member states over the period from 2000 to 2013 and is 
forecast to continue to do so in 2014 and 2015. The rate of growth in the moder-
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ately developed member states, however, fell below that in the highly developed 
member states in 2010 and continued to be lower in 2011–2013 but is forecast 
to be slightly higher as to 2015. (European Commission, 2014: 7) If we look at 
it with the approach from macro geographic dimensions we can state that while 
the least developed regions in the east could continue their convergence, most of 
the southern regions – many of them are moderately developed regions – suffered 
most from the recession. 
The cohesion policy of the European Union – allocating 32 per cent of its total 
budget, the main community level fi nancial support of investments, can be con-
sidered as an east–west stabilizing policy, where the net contributors are typically 
the countries of the more developed West and the main benefi ciaries are in the 
less developed East. It is obvious if we examine the two main funding of cohesion 
policy: Between 2014 and 2020 all the 182 billion euro of the Cohesion Fund is 
channeled to the countries having GDP per capita fi gures less than 90 percent of 
the EU average, which are all the post socialist member states plus Greece and 
Portugal, while in case of the Structural Funds, 182 billion euro is allocated to the 
less developed regions – most of them also located in the eastern zone plus some 
of them in Portugal, Greece and Southern Italy, while only 54 billion is allocated 
to the more developed regions of the EU and about 35 billion to the so-called 
transition regions with 75–90 per cent fi gures. However, the last reform of the co-
hesion policy resulted in a more direct control on EU level, by stronger thematic 
guidance, stricter conditions for member states. It means stronger control over 
the less developed countries, where the EU funding gives the funds for the vast 
majority of all public developments. In 2010–2012, Cohesion Policy funding was 
equivalent to over 75 per cent of public investment in Slovakia, Hungary, Bul-
garia and Lithuania and 57 percent in the cohesion countries. During the crisis, 
the total public investment of member states decreased by 20 per cent in the EU. 
The rapid reduction of public investment was a part of fi scal consolidation efforts 
and it brought increased reliance on cohesion policy.
Dependence of Peripheries?
Based on the World-System Theory of Immanuel Wallerstein and Dependence 
Theory (Wallerstein, 2010), the core-periphery concept is expansively applied 
as an obvious tool to understanding the global world, particularly in literatures 
of sociology and geography. The basic principle of the ‘Core-Periphery’ theory 
is that as general prosperity grows worldwide, the majority of that growth is en-
joyed by a ‘core’ region of wealthy countries despite being severely outnumbered 
in population by those in a ‘periphery’ that are ignored. In the approach of geog-
raphy this duality is understood more in the meaning of physical space, where the 
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core is really in a center of a given territory. Though it is most frequently used in 
global context, looking at the spatial distribution of power, economic perform-
ance and wealth of regions within the EU we can recognize that this concept does 
make sense at a European Union scale. The spatial patterns as these characteris-
tics show exhibit clear relation to the geographic center of the EU. According to 
most of the socio-economic facts the ‘good places’ are really in the geographical 
center of the EU. However, this core–periphery relation can be understood in the 
regional development of countries with strong relation to the monocentric versus 
polycentric character of socio-economic spatial structures or the spatial distribu-
tion of power. 
Nearly half of the GDP of the EU is concentrated in a Western core territory 
called pentagon area, from London to Milan, from Paris to Hamburg, where only 
one third of the population and 14 per cent of the territory of the EU is located. 
(Salamin – Sütő, 2011: 50) The core–periphery division of the territory of the EU 
in development approach was introduced by the expert document of the Hungar-
ian EU presidency entitled “The Territorial State and Perspectives of the Euro-
pean Union” (Salamin – Sütő, 2011: 50–63). As this document pointed out “in 
general terms the economic as well as the accessibility patterns in Europe are 
core-periphery centered with the highest peaks in the core of Europe” (Salamin 
– Sütő, 2011: 50). Although the eastern part of the EU is the most signifi cant 
periphery, we should mention the other peripheries as well. Periphery can be the 
northernmost regions of the EU, mainly due to their extremely low population 
density and lack of bigger, stronger urban centers. In many terms of economic 
performance, however, the northern part of Europe is on equal footing with the 
core area and even outperforms it in some indicators. There are western periph-
eries such as Ireland and also Portugal in many dimensions, while the southern 
region is rapidly becoming periphery since they suffered at most the economic 
crisis. Basically, market forces work towards a concentration of economic activi-
ties, both at European and national levels. At the same time, there are evidently 
catching-up processes underway and areas are developing outside the traditional 
core area. Nonetheless, there are differences even between peripheries: the post-
socialist eastern regions are in a quite different position than Europe’s western 
or the less populated northern peripheries. Tendencies suggest that the European 
core–periphery paradigm shows signs of dissolving. However, these changes are 
very slow. Centrally located economic concentrations still hold the most advanta-
geous positions.
When addressing the core–periphery division of the EU beyond the issue of 
economic disparities we also have to mention the issue of dependence of the 
eastern bloc on the European Union as such (see cohesion policy before), and 
also on certain more developed western economies. As post socialist countries 
have not been able to accumulate any suffi cient quantity of capital, their GDP 
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and especially their export highly depend on the foreign economic agents, while 
their domestic actors do not have a similar infl uence on other countries. Not only 
domestic companies, but also regions and cities of this area have to take part in 
a strong competition that they are not prepared enough for to compete with other 
players, particularly to gain better position in the more and more globally organ-
ized economic value chains, as mentioned before. Their economies are driven 
by foreign direct investments that are also the main factor of the development of 
regions. Obviously the fl ows of profi t also have a similar pattern from the East 
to the West. Small and highly open economies of the eastern bloc are gener-
ally dependent on their main export targets, on the larger markets. In the case of 
Hungary, the economic performance is directly linked to the German economy, 
which is the prime foreign trade partner. The dependence of less developed east-
ern countries on the EU cohesion policy has been already mentioned above. Ac-
cording to the author, the most serious dependency of the east, however, will be 
seen in the issue of demography (see later in the paper).
Distance to the Core of the EU
It is reasonable to address the question of what the core is, where the central 
region of the European Union lies. It is worth seeing whether any regions of the 
post-socialist countries can be considered as part of this central zone. Beyond 
the above mentioned pentagon model developed by ESPON program, the geo-
graphic center of the EU can be localized in different ways according to factors 
we are focusing on. Considering the economic power the territory of the center 
is obviously slightly closer to the west, due to the location of the biggest markets 
– the UK, France, Germany and the Benelux states. Italy and Spain also have 
bigger economies but they are still fi ghting the consequences of the crisis. Nev-
ertheless, as a result of the recent depression the nearly crisis-resistant German 
economy could strengthen its position, while Poland could take steps towards the 
central position as its economy hardly suffered from the crisis. Therefore there 
is a chance that this form of economic core in the EU shifts a bit eastward as a 
result of the economic shock. According to the innovation activity of the regions 
the central territory is more extended towards north due to the strong knowledge 
orientation of the economies of the southern regions of the north of EU. Looking 
at the intensity of patent applications we see that the area from London to Milan, 
from Lyon to Stockholm is the innovation core of the EU, where almost all the 
regions which have more than 150 patent applications a year per million inhabit-
ants are located. (European Commission, 2014: 33) The east is extremely under-
developed in that regard. It is important to note that economic integration itself 
increases the potentials of the regions located in the central area of that territory. 
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The improvement of physical accessibility within the single market – supported 
by the transport policies of the EU – naturally contributes to strengthened center–
periphery relations of the EU. Nevertheless, the less signifi cant neighborhood 
policy provides possibilities to regions along the edge of the Union.
If we understand center–periphery relations in a different way, focusing on 
the quality of life instead of economic and innovation activity, we fi nd a slightly 
different, but still defi nite center–periphery picture, where some regions of the 
eastern bloc can have more chance to be closer to the center of the EU. In this 
approach we identify center as the area that has better quality from a human point 
of view. As we shall see below with this approach the center is shifting eastward. 
A good example is if we take into account a really periphery-related issue, the risk 
of becoming poor or excluded. The higher risk of poverty or social exclusion is an 
important legacy of the economic crisis. In this term, the center – areas with rela-
tively good values – is more extended towards the south-east, for example, the 
Czech Republic and the north-western part of Hungary are also part of this advan-
tageous core, while the northern part of Germany is outside. (See European Com-
mission, 2014: 75–76) However, looking at the increase of risk of poverty rate we 
see that the regions geographically far from the center have lost the most. There 
are now around nine million people at risk of poverty or exclusion in the EU, the 
increase being particularly pronounced in the geographically peripheral areas, 
mostly in Greece, Spain, Italy, Ireland, but also in the UK and Sweden and the 
Baltic states. A key issue is the variation within countries: risk of poverty tends to 
be much lower in cities than in the rest of the country in less developed member 
states, while surprisingly in cities in the more developed member states, the re-
verse is the case. In terms of early school leavers the best center zone of the EU 
consists of Sweden, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Lithuania and the south–
east part of Germany while the regions westward from this zone (and also east-
ward) are in signifi cantly worse positions. (See European Commission, 2014: 67)
In general however, the crisis hit the geographically peripheral areas more se-
verely, particularly the Mediterranean zone, thus amplifying the core–periphery 
division of the EU.
Possible Consequences of Demographic Change
The natural fertility rate is generally very low in Europe with the exception of 
France, the Nordic countries, the UK and Ireland. This trend threatens with seri-
ous economic outcomes mainly due to the predicted loss of workforce and the 
radical changes in the ratio between taxpayers and transfer recipients. Demo-
graphic trends indicate that the working-age population in the EU-27 started to 
fall in 2013, and will decrease by around 39 million (12 per cent) by 2050 com-
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pared to 2008. Migrations can be part of the solution to labor market defi cits both 
in qualitative and quantitative terms. Therefore, in the aging Europe facing severe 
demographic challenges the migration of labor force, which has a clear east-west 
pattern, is a key factor of development. The very high differences between wages 
offered in countries with different economic powers means a constant motivation 
to migrate to work – and later to live – in the western part of the EU (ESPON, 
2011). In relation to geopolitical cases in the Middle East, the more developed 
member states are more likely to prefer eastern European migrants to extra EU 
migrants. The poorest East may lose the most skilled, educated and ambitious 
young groups of society, while migration in the opposite direction is less signifi -
cant. In general economic terms, every wave of migration implies a shift in the 
knowledge base of both the arrival and the departure country. As migrants carry 
different skills with them there can be important processes of increasing or de-
clining skills in the labor force (brain gain or brain drain).
Imbalanced Regional Development within the post-Socialist Countries: 
Regional Polarization is a Side Effect of Transition?
Having reviewed some regional dimensions at EU level economic processes we 
now analyze some characteristics of subnational regional development within 
the countries of the eastern bloc of the European Union and particularly Hun-
gary, identifying the challenge and the possible impact of the crisis. In most of the 
former socialist countries the period since the EU accession in 2004 commenced 
with a peculiar, and historically determined, inherited economic spatial structure 
that has undergone only modest rearrangement during the past ten years. Since the 
early nineties, the trend of increasing territorial inequalities in the Eastern Central 
European countries has been closely linked to the process of conversion into mar-
ket economies and to economic integration to the EU. As mentioned above in this 
changing economic space, many rural regions in the eastern bloc have lost their 
perspective, only some bigger cities – mainly capitals – could become interna-
tional players, while other cities are trying to fi nd their role, but their capability to 
compete effi ciently is questioned in the highly integrated economic arena of the 
single EU market, itself more and more geographically connected (see Figure 3).
After four decades of centrally planned economy in the socialist era, since 
1990 the role of foreign direct investment had been growing increasingly domi-
nant in territorial development as well – through a shift to market economy, mar-
ket liberalization, and then EU integration – resulting in territorial concentration 
of the economy by focusing primarily on capital regions along with mainly the 
western regions. Indeed, in terms of urban size, commercial projects tended to 
increasingly give preference to sites in larger towns and cities. The faster devel-
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opment of the western parts of these countries can be perceived resulting in an 
east-west division of the economic space also within the countries.
Note: Ratio of the per-capita GDP in the most advanced NUTS2 level region to the least advanced 
one in the given country, their unweighted average in the various groups of countries. Overseas 
regions and the states comprising a single region are not taken into account. 
Club Med: Greece, Portugal, Italy, Spain
V4: Hungary Poland, Czech Rep., Slovakia
Figure 3. Territorial concentration of GDP within the countries 
on the basis of their range, 2011 (Based on Eurostat data)
Behind the high regional inequalities, it is important to recognize the lack of 
suffi cient infrastructure in rural areas in these countries. Internal peripheries are 
unique type of rural peripheries specifi c to Eastern Central Europe with serious 
problems. Their peripherality stems primarily from their poor accessibility, and 
is deepened by the paucity of real urban centers where essential central functions 
could be concentrated. These problems derive from the historical under-develop-
ment of these territories and specifi c features of the settlement network or social 
characteristics often compound them. The main problems of these areas are their 
weak and vulnerable regional economies and their lack of appropriate job oppor-
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tunities. In these circumstances, negative demographic processes, notably out-
migration and aging of the population, are getting stronger and stronger. These 
trends create conditions for social exclusion, and even territorial exclusion from 
mainstream socio-economic processes and opportunities. While rural ghettos are 
mainly a result of social factors, ethnic segregation can render diffi cult situations 
even worse. This is the case, for example, in rural peripheries of Slovakia, Hun-
gary and Romania where there are areas with high proportions of Roma popula-
tion. This is a non-disappearing specifi city of the post socialist Eastern Central 
Europe, while in the West the social segregation is mainly the challenge of urban 
areas, emerging particularly in connection with immigrants.
As the cohesion report points out, during the last decade the increase of dis-
parities was particularly high in Bulgaria and in Romania (where the coeffi cient 
of variation increased by 22 percentage points and twelve percentage points, re-
spectively), mainly because of the high growth rate in the capital city region. (Eu-
ropean Commission, 2014: 5) While GDP per head in the other regions in the two 
countries still converged towards the EU average, it was at a much slower rate. 
Regional disparities, however, also widened in Greece and the UK over these 
eleven years (the coeffi cient of variation increasing by twelve and eight percent-
age points, respectively), but in both cases partly because GDP per head declined 
relative to the EU average in a number of less developed regions.
Increasing Regional Economic Disparities in Hungary
In comparison to the average of the EU-28 countries and especially in the light 
of the small size of the country, the internal territorial inequalities are particularly 
large in Hungary. In longer term the decreasing role of agriculture resulted in the 
loss of economic weight of regions, which had more agricultural orientation, pri-
marily in the Great Plain during the last decades. The transition crisis in the 1990s 
hit most the so-called “socialist industrial districts”, which is still causing prob-
lems in economic development, primarily in the former heavy industry regions 
of Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén, Nógrád and Baranya counties. Komárom-Esztergom 
County, particularly its seat, Tatabánya, is perhaps the only heavy industrial dis-
trict of the socialist era, which could recover and attain signifi cant economic 
prosperity. The foreign direct investment, however, had a very concentrated re-
gional preference focusing mainly on Budapest and the north-west of Hungary.
The overall consequence is that territorial inequalities have been growing stead-
ily within Hungary since the mid-1990s, creating severe differences in the levels 
of development between the capital city and the rest of the country as well as 
between the eastern and the western part of the country, including a general lag in 
the development of territories without major cities or towns (see Figure 4). If we 
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look at the regional pattern of Hungary’s modest convergence to the EU average 
since the accession, we fi nd that it is in fact the very fast (but slowing) develop-
ment of Budapest and a modest improvement of the position of Western Trans-
danubia and the Northern Great Plain, while the other four regions of the coun-
try have been showing stagnation or even deteriorating positions (see Table 2).
Table 2. The relative position of Hungarian regions among the 274 regions of the EU28, in terms 
of per-capita gross domestic product (2011) (Data source: Eurostat)
Region
2004 2011
GDP/capita PPS 
EU-28=100
position in 
ranking order
GDP/capita PPS 
EU-28=100
position in 
ranking order
Central-Hungary 101 124 110   79
Western Transdanubia   65 225   68 218
Central Transdanubia   60 233   59 241
Southern Transdanubia   45 251   45 259
Southern Great Plain   44 252   44 260
Northern Great Plain   41 256   43 263
Northern Hungary   41 257   40 265
The domestic territorial development policy (which was particularly dedicated 
to tackle less developed regions) and the EU funds, available to Hungary in in-
creasing scale since the accession, have not induced much improvement in the 
way of reducing the inequalities in economic growth in the various regions; at 
least no signifi cant results could be observed up to 2010. Although the criterion 
of regional convergence appeared in the strategies and programs prepared for 
applying to the utilization of funds, and regional operational programs defi ned 
on local levels were launched, the businesses and organizations of the more ad-
vanced regions were able to gain access to a greater extent to the funds allocated 
predominantly through such application schemes. The regional operational pro-
grams defi ned territorially – although they have accomplished signifi cant results 
for instance in the development of settlements and, in general, in the quick ab-
sorption of funds – were not, for the most part, effi ciently adjusted to the different 
conditions and resources of the different regions (which should have been one of 
their main advantages); accordingly, they remained standardized and typically 
failed to foster effi cient development projects, which could generate signifi cant 
economic growth in the regions concerned. This was accompanied by a relatively 
low proportion of the funds dedicated within the structural funds to economic de-
velopment in the Hungarian operational programs. In the new 2014–2020 period 
of EU cohesion policy Hungary developed a more economy oriented strategy 
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and the aspects of territoriality are more integrated – as Péti pointed out in his 
work (Péti, 2014). Transportation – primarily: highway – development projects 
implemented for the most part with EU funding from accession have also failed 
to bring about the expected spectacular economic benefi ts in the rural regions. 
For example, the disadvantaged regions that have become accessible through the 
extended M3 and M6 highways in Baranya, Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén and Hajdú-
Bihar counties are not showing signs of growing economic dynamics, indeed, the 
Budapest-centered large infrastructure development projects may indeed have, in 
many cases, enhanced the agglomerational advantages of the region of Budapest 
over the rest of the country (see Figure 4).
Core–Periphery, the Dominant Pattern in the Spatial Structure of Hungary
In the economic spatial structure of Hungary, the core-periphery dichotomy ap-
pears most pronouncedly among the EU countries. Forty percent of the GDP is 
generated, and two thirds of research and development (R+D) capacity is located 
Figure 4. Per-capita GDP and its ratio relative to the EU average 
in the NUTS3 level counties of Hungary in terms of purchasing power parity (PPS), 2013 
(Based on KSH data, map prepared with the support of J Gutpintér)
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in Budapest, while only 18 percent of the total population lives there. Obviously 
this situation has a particular historical background: at the end of the World War I, 
Hungary lost two third of its territory including all the major regional urban cent-
ers that could theoretically have counterbalanced Budapest. Several strategies 
(governmental concepts of 1971, 2005 and 2014) attempted since at developing 
momentous urban centers in the countryside but they could never achieve real 
results. Since the EU accession this duality between the capital and the rest of 
the country has further risen. Budapest has been able to improve its international 
importance and become one of the most interesting, vibrant focal point of this 
part of Europe. Hungary’s monocentric territorial structure, the overly Budapest-
centered transport system, the lack of transversal links or even the defi ciencies 
of the settlement network, impede the economic development in rural regions 
while this structure is not even benefi cial for Budapest beyond a certain point. 
The excessive concentration of the economy – primarily in Budapest and a hand-
ful of other regions – may result in massive losses in effi ciency, e.g. as a conse-
quence of the scarcity of available commercial sites, transport, the increasingly 
concentrated environmental burdens, commuting and the costs of the treatment 
of economically depleted rural areas.
The Impact of Crisis on Regional Disparities
As I have mentioned, on the general EU level the crisis suspended the reduction 
in regional disparities that had taken place until 2009. In Hungary the process of 
divergence of regions that had continued practically unbroken since the EU ac-
cession seemed to be grinding to a halt in the wake of the 2008–2009 economic 
crisis; indeed, a process of leveling among regions was also observed in certain 
years (see Figure 5). According to the territorial GDP and investment statistics 
released for the period up to 2012, the decrease in territorial inequalities has not 
so much been driven by dynamic convergence of the lagging regions as by a de-
celeration in the growth of the most advanced regions. This is because it was the 
most advanced counties that were hardest hit at that time by the economic crisis 
which affected each county to different extents, i.e. the regions with the highest 
proportions of foreign direct investment, whose output was most heavily exposed 
to the quickly responding external demand as well as to retail consumption and 
investment demand driven largely by currency loans. It was primarily the highly 
developed Western and Central Transdanubian regions that were hit hardest by 
the economic downturn in 2009. Nonetheless, the three most developed regions 
– Central Hungary, Western Transdanubia and Central Transdanubia – with 24 per-
cent of Hungary’s total population, still generated two-thirds of Hungary’s GDP, 
and some 89 per cent of foreign direct investments that can be geographically 
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localized was operating in businesses having their registered offi ces in these re-
gions. From 2010 the economic weight of Budapest within Hungary started to de-
crease, even if only to a slight degree. On the other hand, Pest county, comprising 
the agglomeration of the capital city, has been gradually falling back since 2008 
not only in absolute terms, but also in the ranking order of the counties, despite 
the fact that up to 2007 it seemed to be on the way to becoming a dynamic re-
gion linked to Budapest. During the pre-crisis years the intensive residential con-
struction boom in the Budapest agglomeration resulted in strong suburbanization 
that was partly a consequence of the growth in the provision of foreign currency 
loans; due to this, tensions are particularly strong in this region. We cannot judge 
yet whether this change in regional development dynamics is a real turning point 
or only a temporary leveling effect of the recession.
Conclusions
In spite of the modest and decelerating convergence of Eastern Central Europe 
we see that the post socialist EU members have not been able to attain the eco-
nomic development and welfare level of the West, and there is not an observable 
trend of doing that within reasonable time. Only the most developed regions, 
Note: The index measures the territorial distribution of GDP relative to the territorial distribution 
of the population. Its value range: 1–100 (1 = no territorial difference).
Figure 5. Developments in the territorial inequality of GDP at the county level, 
on the basis of the Hoover index (based on KSH data)
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typically the capitals could exceed the EU average measured at purchasing power 
parity. However in several dimensions the regions of these countries are depend-
ing on the western economies or on the European Union as such. In several socio-
economic terms, such as health, the difference between the East and the West of 
the EU is still very sharp, while demographic trends with increasing westward 
migration patterns resulting in loss of labor force may threaten the future eco-
nomic development of eastern EU countries. What is more, most of the eastern 
bloc countries have become regionally more fragmented in terms of economic 
prosperity, quality of life by today as a result of a regional divergence within 
countries. Economic transition and EU integration were followed by imbalanced 
regional development as a result of the dominant role of the foreign direct invest-
ments in regional development, which led to the concentration and increase of 
territorial inequalities within these countries. The economic crisis has exerted 
a territorially diverse infl uence that has modifi ed regional development, e.g. by 
increasing the importance of difference between North and South. The crisis has 
seemed to slow down or even stop this spatial concentration in Hungary.
In spite of the higher growth potential of the eastern part of the EU there is a 
risk that without changes its periphery position will be conserved in longer term. 
However, the recent economic recession indeed launched changes.
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